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DOES INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE AFFECT ENTREPRENEURIAL MOBILITY? 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE FINANCIAL ANALYSIS MARKET 
 
Our paper contributes to the studies on the relationship between workers’ human capital and their 
decision to become self-employed as well as their probability to survive as entrepreneurs.   
Analysis from a panel data set of research analysts in investment banks over 1988-1996 reveals 
that star analysts are more likely than non-star analysts to become entrepreneurs.  Furthermore, 
we find that ventures started by star analysts have a higher probability of survival than ventures 
established by non-star analysts.  Extending traditional theories of entrepreneurship and labor 
mobility, our results also suggest that drivers of turnover vary by destination: (a) turnover to 
entrepreneurship and (b) other turnover.  In contrast to turnover to entrepreneurship, star analysts 
are less likely to move to other firms than non-star analysts.          
Key words Entrepreneurship,  ability, professionals   3
1.  Introduction 
Are high performers more likely to become entrepreneurs than low performers?  News 
accounts are filled with anecdotes of talented professionals making it on their own.  These 
accounts emphasize ability as the key trigger for high performers becoming entrepreneurs and 
the subsequent success of their ventures (Dorfman 1974; Milligan 1985; Kostigen 1990; Phillips 
1997).  Although casual observations abound, studies that shed light on the following issues are 
lacking: (1) Are high performers more likely to become entrepreneurs than low performers?  (2) 
Are high performers more likely to survive as entrepreneurs than low performers?  (3) Are there 
differences between determinants of turnover to entrepreneurship and determinants of other 
turnover?  The focus of our investigation is the empirical phenomenon that, among professionals, 
talent may be an important driver for starting one’s own firm.
1 
To address these questions, we studied turnover data for security analysts for the nine-
year period from 1988 through 1996.  We matched samples of entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs in the same decision-making setting, and thus avoided sample selection bias.  
Further, having non-entrepreneurs in our data set allowed us to compare the determinants of 
entrepreneurial turnover to factors that affect other turnover.  The availability of detailed 
individual and firm level data on equity analysts makes this labor market a particularly attractive 
setting for our analysis.  Institutional Investor magazine’s annual All-America analyst rankings 
divide analysts into stars and non-stars enabling a clear distinction between high and low 
performers.
2  Analysts’ rankings are externally observable, which ensures that their performance 
is visible to the market and makes it possible to compile rich data at five levels of analysis: 
individual, department, firm, sectoral, and macro-economic.  Collecting data at these various 
levels enabled us to control for a large range of potential drivers of turnover.
 3   4
Our multilevel longitudinal data set on equity analysts enables us to address two 
criticisms commonly leveled against existing empirical research in entrepreneurship–that the 
analysis is (a) cross-sectional and (b) single-level.  Cross-sectional analysis is susceptible to self-
selection bias because it under represents individuals that attempt but fail in entrepreneurial 
pursuits.  Longitudinal observations identify more completely the expanse of entrepreneurial 
initiatives (Evans and Leighton 1989).  Data limitations have precluded prior studies from 
controlling for both individual and situational variables as drivers of the entrepreneurial decision.  
In particular, the advantage of this paper is that it uses variables that are more directly related to 
the overall abilities of the potential entrepreneurs. 
Whereas we used a number of econometric techniques (discussed later in the paper) to 
check the robustness of the results, the limitation of our study is that a small percentage of 
analysts in our sample became entrepreneurs (45 episodes).  However, this paper and analysts’ 
data set allow us to better understand the entrepreneurial behavior among knowledge workers, 
the relationship between workers’ talent and their decision to become self-employed and their 
probability to survive as entrepreneur, as well as the process of business formation among 
highly-skilled professionals. 
By exploring the phenomenon of entrepreneurship within the context of a particular labor 
market, we contribute to research in entrepreneurship (Knight 1921; Schumpeter 1934; Lucas 
1978; Evans and Leighton 1989; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000), 
talent allocation (Rosen 1981), and labor market competition (Lazear 1986).  Finally, we shed 
light on new venture creation among professionals, a subject that has been explored previously 
only on related topics for physicians (Headen 1990; Wholey, et al. 1993), accountants (Pennings, 
et al. 1998), and biotechnology scientists (Zucker, et al. 1998).
4       5
   
 
2.  Related Literature 
Theoretical economic models of entrepreneurial choice have generated a number of 
predictions.  Knight (1921) suggested that the choice between operating a risky firm or working 
for a riskless wage is influenced by (a) the availability of enough capital to guarantee the factors 
their fixed remuneration, (b) a willingness to bear uncertainty, and (c) entrepreneurial ability.  
Based on those suggestions, some theorists have modeled the occupational choice problem under 
the assumptions of liquidity constraints (Evans and Jovanovic 1989), risk aversion (Kihlstrom 
and Laffont 1979) and heterogeneous abilities (Lucas 1978; Jovanovic 1982; Holmes and 
Schmitz 1990; Jovanovic and Nyarko 1996; Lazear 2002; Irigoyen 2002, Nanda and Sorensen 
2004).  In the last 25 years, these theorists have established a significant body of research on 
entrepreneurship.   
Central to this paper are studies that consider human capital a key factor in predicting 
occupational choice.  More specifically, our empirical study is guided by theoretical models that 
point to one’s level of ability as the sorting mechanism to an individual selecting 
entrepreneurship (Lucas 1978; Rosen 1981; Rosen 1982; Jovanovic and Nyarko 1996; Irigoyen 
2002, Nanda and Sorensen 2004).  In his static model of size-distribution of firms, Lucas (1978) 
developed an equilibrium theory that assumed an allocation of productive factors over managers 
of different ability so as to maximize output.  Lucas characterizes “managerial (or 
entrepreneurial) technology” by two elements: “variable skill or talent and an element of 
diminishing returns to scale or to span of control” (Lucas 1978, p. 511).  For efficient allocations, 
he predicts, it will be the most talented only who manage new firms, and other agents under the   6
cutoff equilibrium level will remain employees.  Similarly, Rosen (1982), in his model on the 
distribution of earnings, attributes choice of position (as well as skewed differences in earnings) 
to the latent talent possessed by each person.
5  He writes, “. . . for efficiency, the scale economy 
of management inputs requires that the most able personnel be assigned to top level positions in 
very large firms” (Rosen 1982, p. 313).  Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) use the Stepping Stone 
Model to discuss the concept of mobility.  The Stepping Stone model says that “activities that are 
informationally “close” will form a ladder, but the safer ones should come first: they are a 
natural training ground because in such activities, mistakes imply smaller foregone 
output.”(Jovanovic and Nyarko 1996, p.29).  Finally, in his most recent model, Irigoyen (2002) 
proposes a dynamic model in which the most able individuals will select into entrepreneurship 
since their youth, whereas people in the middle of the distribution will work for someone else 
during their early employment and then switch to entrepreneurship.
6  Zucker et al. (1998) 
provide empirical support for this prediction.  They find that leading researchers establish their 
companies to capture the rents to their intellectual capital.  Summarizing, these models suggest 
that more talented individuals will become entrepreneurs.   
Likewise, there is a long tradition of empirical research in entrepreneurship that explores 
factors that affect the chances of a firm’s survival during the ventures’ early years.
7  Initial 
economic endowments and financial access are key factors that explain new venture survival 
(Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Evans and Leighton 1989; Holtz-Eakin, et al. 1994; Dunn and 
Holtz-Eakin 2000).  Other empirical models explore the effect of human capital variables on firm 
survival.  Age (as a proxy for human capital endowment of business founders), years of 
schooling, years of experience (Evans and Leighton 1989), the founder’s social capital (Shane 
and Stuart, 2002), university degrees (Burke, et al. 2000), prior self-employment experience,   7
leadership experience, and parental self-employment experience (Burke, et al. 2000) are 
positively related to new venture success.  However, we are not aware of any study that 
associates a firm’s survival with an individual’s talent. 
 
3.  The Data, Variables and Aggregate Statistics 
3.1  The data set 
“Sell-side” analysts employed by brokerage houses to follow companies in a particular 
industry sector or investment specialty generate information, such as earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations, and detailed research reports on the companies.  Sell-side analysts’ clients are 
the buy-side, meaning institutional investors, which include money management firms, mutual 
funds, hedge funds, and pension funds.  Every year in mid-October, Institutional Investor 
magazine publishes an “All-America Research Team” list that ranks equity analysts by sector at 
four levels: first, second, third, and runner-up.  The editor's letter asks voters to rank the analysts 
who "have been most helpful to you and your institution in researching U.S. equities over the 
past twelve months."  The identities of the survey respondents and the institutions they work for 
are kept confidential.  Survey respondents give one overall numerical score to every research 
analyst in each industry sector.  The votes are cumulated using weights based on the size of the 
voting institution.
8  An analyst can be ranked in more than one sector; however, only a small 
percentage of analysts achieve rankings in multiple sectors.  Some, but not all, star analysts in a 
given year continue to be ranked in subsequent years.  Siconolfi (1992) writes of the exhaustive 
ranking process that “[t]here aren’t many other jobs in America where peoples’ performances are 
externally rated so specifically.”    8
Because institutional clients make their own buy decisions, institutional investors, as they 
search for specific pieces of information, value the work of an analyst on all six dimensions.  
Clients want the analyst to add value to their decision-making process (Brenner 1991).  When 
analysts' clients were asked to rank, in order of importance, the factors that most attributed to a 
successful security firm, industry knowledge emerged as a solid first, followed by stock 
selection, written reports, special services, earnings estimates, servicing, quality of sales force, 
and market making/execution (Institutional Investor 1998).  The net result of this exhaustive 
Institutional Investor ranking process is that the poll is a good representation of where customers 
find value from research analysts (Siconolfi 1992).  Hence, the rankings are a more complete and 
comprehensive proxy of the analyst’s ability than the performance of stock recommendations 
and/or the analysts' earnings forecast accuracy.  
The market recognizes that ranked analysts perform better than their non-ranked 
counterparts (Stickel 1992).  All-American ranked analysts supply more accurate earnings 
forecasts than other analysts and make recommendations that do not follow the crowd (Stickel 
1990; Stickel 1992).  Consequently, an Institutional Investor ranking can mean hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in extra annual pay for analysts (Laderman 1998).
9    
From the annual issues of Institutional Investor magazine’s “All-America Research 
Team” listings, we identified, for the nine-year period from 1988 through 1996, 3,513 ranked 
equity analysts (analyst-year combinations) from 62 firms.  We focused on the top 24 investment 
banking firms that employed more than 15 ranked analysts over the nine years covered by the 
study.  These firms accounted for 3,408 ranked analyst names, which was 97 percent of all the 
analysts ranked during this period.  From the annual issues of the Nelson’s Directory of 
Investment Research, published at the end of each calendar year, we identified 6,123 names of   9
unranked equity analysts belonging to the top 24 firms.  These firms accounted for 38 percent of 
the equity analysts (25,053) employed in the United States over the period covered by our data.  
The total sample of 9,531 names (analyst-year combinations) represented 2,602 individual 
analysts.
10   
Although 36 percent of the analysts in our sample of 24 firms are ranked, relative to the 
entire security industry this proportion would be much smaller because analysts in smaller firms 
primarily tend to be unranked.  Although our selection approach biases our data in favor of 
greater representation of ranked analysts, it helps us control for demographic, analyst 
performance, departmental, firm, sector, and macroeconomic variables because such information 
is more readily available for the top 24 firms.  (Demographic and departmental characteristics 
are often not available for research boutiques.)  By focusing on the top 24 firms, we were able to 
track individual analysts and identify different types of turnover: (a) moved to entrepreneurship, 
(b) moved to competitors within the research industry, or (c) moved to companies outside the 
research industry.  We have made the trade-off in favor of richer information for the smaller 
subset of the analysts belonging to the top 24 firms.  
Independent variables are divided into five categories: individual variables; research 
department variables; firm variables; sector variables; and macroeconomic variables.  Summary 
statistics for the variables used in the subsequent analysis are presented in panels A and B of 
Table 1. 
3.2   Dependent  variables 
By tracking ranked and unranked equity analysts in the subsequent year’s Nelson’s 
Directory of Investment Research and Institutional Investor listings and searching during the 
year the Lexis-Nexis, Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S), and the National   10
Association of Security Dealers data bases, we were able to identify, in each year from 1988 
through 1996, whether analysts (a) stayed with their original firms, (b) moved to 
entrepreneurship, (c) moved to competitors within the research industry, or (d) moved to 
companies outside the research industry.  We also identified 362 moves by analysts to other 
responsibilities within the same firms.  Because intra-firm mobility is difficult to distinguish 
from inter-firm movement, prior research tends to include such moves in turnover figures.  
Because such moves have complex dynamics (including aspects of promotion, demotion, and job 
rotation) different from firm exits, we excluded these observations from our data set. 
Over the nine-year period, we identified 1,777 total moves among the 9,531 analysts for a 
turnover rate of 18.6 percent per annum.  Of the analysts who moved, 45 made a transition to 
entrepreneurship, 1,673 represented other turnover (moved to competitors, moved to buy-side, 
laid off, retired, died, joined the firms they had been covering for years).
11  There is no 
discernible time trend in turnover.  Summary statistics on mobility of the analysts are given in 
Table 2.  
The variable EntrepreneurialChoicei,t is 1 if analyst i became an entrepreneur during year 
t, 0 otherwise.  Using EntrepreneurialChoicei,t as a dependent variable confounds two different 
types of non-entrepreneurs: non-entrepreneurs who stayed and non-entrepreneurs who moved.  
Next, we distinguish between two types of moves: moves to entrepreneurship and other moves.  
The variable Movesi,t is defined to take the value of “NoMovesi,t “ if analyst i did not move 
during year t, “EntrepreneurialMovesi,t” if analyst i became an entrepreneur during year t, and 
“OtherMovesi,t“ if the analyst i moved to non entrepreneurial position during year t .
12  The two 
dichotomies compare groups “EntrepreneurialMovesi,t” and “OtherMovesi,t“ to “NoMovesi,t”, to 
test the general hypothesis that different types of turnover have different causal antecedents.      11
Turnover rate to competitors is 0.5 percent per annum: 0.8 percent per annum (28 out of 
3,408) among ranked analysts; 0.3 percent per annum (17 out of 6,123) among non-ranked 
analysts.  Forty-four analysts founded money management firms, hedge funds, and research and 
advisory companies; one star analyst founded an airline company.  All new ventures were 
established in the areas in which analysts specialized, suggesting that analysts attempt to 
leverage sector-specific skills in their entrepreneurial ventures.  The reasons why only a small 
percentage of analysts became entrepreneurs can be found in the characteristics of their labor 
market.
13 
Finally, we introduce the VentureSurvival variable to test whether the probability of the 
new venture survival differs for high-ability analysts from that of low-ability analysts.  
VentureSurvivali,t+3  is 1 if analyst i moved to self employment during year t and his/her new 
venture still exists after three years, 0 if analyst i moved to self employment during year t and 
his/her new venture does not exist after three years.     
3.3   Individual variables 
We examined a number of individual and contextual variables that are identified to be 
important in theoretical mobility models and empirical tests (Lucas 1978; Jovanovic 1982; 
Eccles and Crane 1988; Evans and Leighton 1989; Holmes and Schmitz 1990; Holtz-Eakin, et al. 
1994; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Irigoyen 2002; Lazear 
2002).   
We researched issues of Institutional Investor as far back as 1972 (the first year of 
rankings) to trace the number of years each analyst was ranked.  Hence, our sample includes 
analysts who have never been ranked as well as analysts who have appeared in the Institutional 
Investor rankings for a quarter of a century.  Four hundred and twenty of the 9,531 analysts (4.4   12
percent of the data set, 12.3 percent of the 3,408 ranked analysts) were ranked for the first time.  
On average, analysts in our data set were ranked approximately thrice.  Median star tenure was 0 
years; 57.2 percent of the analysts have never been ranked.  Focusing on ranked analysts only, 
average star tenure was 7.2 years. 
We collected analysts’ demographic and career characteristics (gender and number of 
years of experience in the industry) by conducting searches on Lexis-Nexis, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers web database, Institutional Brokers Estimate System, and Dow 
Jones News.  In our sample, 76.5 percent of analysts are male.
14  On average, an analyst in our 
sample had 7.62 years of experience, worked at the same firm for 5.27 years, and held 1.59 jobs.  
The independent variable AnalystStari,t is 1 if analyst i is ranked in year t.  
AnalystStarTenurei,t is the number of years analyst i has been ranked as of the end of year t.  To 
distinguish further between high- and low-ability analysts, we introduce another variable.  
AnalystAllStar is 1 for analysts who have been stars for at least five years and are currently stars, 
0 otherwise.  To capture demographic and career characteristics, we define three other variables.  
AnalystGenderi,t is 1 if analyst i is male, 0 if female. AnalystExperiencei,t is the total number of 
years analyst i has worked as of October 15
th of year t.  AnalystJobsi,t is the number of career-
related jobs analyst i has held as of October 15
th of year t.
15   
3.4   Research department variables 
The quality of the research department is operationalized according to the Greenwich 
Associates Institutional Research Services rankings of research departments.  Every year, 
interviews with approximately 3,000 investment professionals are used to produce the rankings 
of the best research departments.  Portfolio managers and buy-side analysts are asked to name 
their top sources for investment ideas.  Buy-side professionals are quizzed about service,   13
products, knowledge, and the performance of brokerage houses’ sales representatives.
16  
DepartmentQualityi,t is the percentage of institutional clients who rate the brokerage house as 
having the best ten research department in analyst i’s research department in year t.  An average 
research department quality was 30.83. 
3.5   Firm variables 
To estimate firm performance for all the firms in our data set, we developed a profit 
proxy–the sum of equity and debt underwriting and merger and acquisition fees during the year.  
From Securities Data Corporation, we collected firms’ profit data based on U.S. merger and 
acquisition fees (based on credit to target and acquirer advisers), U.S. equity underwriting gross 
spreads (based on credit full to each lead manager), and U.S. debt underwriting gross spread 
(credit full to each lead manager).  These three figures are summed to generate the profit proxy 
for a firm for a particular year.  We calculate the proportion of total profits generated by each of 
the 24 firms in our data set during a particular year.  To estimate change in relative profit 
performance, we calculate for each firm the proportionate change in this relative profit from one 
year to the next.  On average, relative profit increased during any given year by 25.2 percent; 
median increase is 3.4 percent per annum.  FirmPerformancei,t is the proportional change during 
the year preceding time t in the ratio of analyst i’s firm profits from equity and debt underwriting 
and merger and acquisition advisory fees to the total industry profits.
17  In addition, 
FirmDummyi,t controls for firm-level variation.   
3.6   Sector variables 
We grouped the sectors in 80 categories according to the Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System.  In cases where an analyst covers more than one sector, the sector was chosen based on 
the number of firms an analyst tracks in one sector compared to another, as it appeared in the   14
Institutional Brokers Estimate System database.  An average sector was followed by 137 equity 
analysts in any given year, although there are wide variations in coverage.  SectorSizei,t is the 
total number of equity analysts following analyst i’s sector as of year t.  SectorDummyi,t controls 
for sector-level variation.
18   
3.7   Macroeconomic variables 
We use proportionate change in the S&P 500 index (as a broad economic indicator) to 
estimate macroeconomic performance in the years preceding each of the nine years.  Our study 
covers both a period of macroeconomic decline and a period of macroeconomic expansion.  On 
average, during any one year, the S&P index increased by 11.3 percent.  S&P500Performance,t 
is the proportional change in the S&P 500 index during the year preceding time t.  
 
4.  Models And Results 
4.1 Stardom and Entrepreneurial Choice 
We estimate the probability of an analyst becoming an entrepreneur as a function of 




(1)   P (EntrepreneurialChoicei,t+1 ) = α + β1 x AnalystStari,t + β2 x AnalystGenderi,t   
+  β3 x AnalystExperiencei,t  + β4 x AnalystExperience
2
i,t  + β5 x AnalystJobsi,t + β6 x 
FirmDummyi,t +β7 x SectorDummyi,t  + β8 x YearDummyt + εi,t+1   
Column (1) in Table 3 presents a regression that estimates the probability of becoming an 
entrepreneur as a function of analyst stardom, individual, firm, sector, and macroeconomic 
variables.
20  The regression controls for all firm-specific, sector-specific, and intertemporal 
variations by using firm, sector, and year dummies in the regressions.  AnalystStar has a   15
significant positive coefficient (p < 0.01).  Being ranked by Institutional Investor magazine 
increases the probability of becoming an entrepreneur with a marginal effect of 0.7 percent over 
the mean (0.5 percent).  Being male increases the probability of becoming an entrepreneur (p < 
0.05) at the mean by 0.5 percent.  AnalystExperience and AnalystJobs have insignificant 
coefficients.  
Column (1) of Table 3 conducts a stringent test of the influence of stardom on the 
probability of analyst turnover by using firm, sector, and year dummies in the regressions.  
Column (2) estimates the probability of becoming an entrepreneur as a function of analyst 
stardom, and a variety of department (the quality of the research department), firm (firm 
performance), sector (sector size), and macroeconomic (macroeconomic performance) variables.  
The estimating equation for column (2) is (2). 
(2)   P (EntrepreneurialChoicei,t+1 ) = α + β1 x AnalystStari,t + β2 x AnalystGenderi,t    
+  β3 x AnalystExperiencei,t + β4 x AnalystExperience
2
i,t  + β5 x AnalystJobsi,t + β6 x 
DepartmentQualityi,t      + β7 x FirmPerformancei,t + β8 x SectorSizei,t + β9 x 
S&P500Performancet  + εi,t+1   
Results in column (2) of Table 3 for individual variables are; AnalystStar remains 
positive significant (p < 0.01).  The research department variable, DepartmentQuality, is not 
significant.  We also find that firm performance does not significantly influence the probability 
of analyst turnover to entrepreneurship.  The sector variable also does not have a significant 
coefficient.  At the macroeconomic level, we find that the probability of analyst entrepreneurial 
turnover is not sensitive to the proportional change in the S&P 500 index.   16
Finally, to further distinguish between different analysts’ ability level, we substitute 
AnalystStar by AnalystAllStar.  Analysts who are repeatedly ranked by Institutional Investor 
magazine are considered all-stars because they are able to sustain their performance over a 
period of time.  This is a stronger test on whether analysts’ performance affects their probability 
of becoming an entrepreneur.  Regression results are shown in column (3) of Table 3.  
AnalystAllStar has a significant positive coefficient (p < 0.05).  Hence, established all-star 
performers tend to have a greater propensity to become self-employed.  The predicted probability 
of exit at the mean is 0.4 percent.  Being an all-star increases the probability of turnover to 
entrepreneurship by 0.6 percent at the mean.  The results for other variables remain largely 
unchanged.  
Overall, our results suggest that analysts’ ability and gender (individual factors) influence 
turnover to entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship, however, is not driven by situational variables; 
for example, at the department level by quality, at the firm level by performance, at the sector 
level by size, or at the macroeconomic level by performance.
21   
Entrepreneurial analysts identified the following categories of motives for their 
departures: the urge to broaden their account base (strict limitations at the former firms on what 
clients cover); the desire to put their own stamp on the organization by building a firm based on 
their values; to obtain the freedom of investment thought (independence from politics of the firm 
on what stocks to recommend); the chance for the analysts to make more money and capitalize 
on their talents; the burnout factor of their former research jobs (the long hours, the marketing 
demands, the travel, the pressure to generate the investment banking deals); and personality 
conflicts.  Some ranked analysts indicate that they left because by achieving a star status, they 
accomplished the highest honor in the research business and there was no room to grow.  A   17
number of stars indicated that they decided to become entrepreneurs after evaluating their life 
accomplishments, with many stating that they reached a point in their lives where they knew if 
they didn't make the break, they never would and later would regret it. 
In supplemental analysis, we also control for relative analyst accuracy, absolute analyst 
accuracy, and visibility. 
Relative Accuracy.  We estimated analysts’ average earnings forecast accuracy during the 
sample period using the same measure of relative forecast accuracy as Hong, Kubik and 
Solomon (2000) and Hong and Kubik (2003). For each company and quarter that an analyst 
issued an earnings forecast, we ranked the analyst on forecast accuracy relative to all other 
analysts from the IBES dataset covering the same company and quarter. When an analyst issued 
multiple forecasts for the same company-quarter, we selected the latest forecast to estimate 
forecast accuracy ranking. Percentile ranks (ranging from a low of 0% for the least accurate 
analyst to 100% for the most accurate analyst) were constructed the following: 
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where Rankijt is analyst j’s forecast accuracy rank for firm i in quarter t, and Company Coveragejt 
is the number of analysts issuing forecasts for firm i in quarter t. The Percentile Rank estimates 
are then averaged across firms and quarters covered by the analyst to provide an average 
measure of an individual’s relative forecast accuracy.  The IBES data is less complete than the 
Nelson database. The number of observations drops as we try to match the IBES dataset to the 
analyst observations. However, when this variable is included in our regressions, it is not 
statistically significant.    18
Absolute Accuracy. We also constructed a measure of the absolute forecast accuracy of an 
analyst following the Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) and Hong and Kubik (2003) 
methodologies. We measured the analyst’s accuracy for a particular firm in a given year by 
focusing on the absolute difference between her forecast and the actual earning per share number 
of the firm. The absolute difference was scaled by the stock price. Because analysts follow 
multiple firms, we aggregated this forecasting accuracy measure across all the firms that an 
analyst covers. Similar to Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) and Hong and Kubik (2003), we 
aggregate the average forecast errors for all firms for the three previous years compared to doing 
it for one year because some analysts cover few firms and, therefore, these analysts’ measures 
are noisy if they are done for one year. After including this measure in our regressions, it the 
absolute accuracy variable is not statically significant.  
Visibility.  One alternative explanation is that star analysts are more visible and, therefore, 
exposed to more business opportunities.  We focused on press coverage to measure analysts’ 
visibility. All press searches were performed in Factiva, which covers all major wire services, 
major, national, and regional publications. For each year and for every analyst, we obtained the 
number of press articles.  Examining the effect of the press coverage on entrepreneurial turnover, 
we find that the relationship is not significant. 
We show that an analyst's absolute and relative forecasting ability as well as visibility has 
no effect on an analyst's decision to start a new firm. The stardom variable might be capturing 
important dimensions that are significant for entrepreneurship: client service and accessibility, 
industry knowledge, and the quality of written reports. 
In the next section, we examine whether drivers of entrepreneurship turnover are 
different from factors that determine other movements.     19
 
4.2 Stardom and All Moves 
As we mentioned earlier, using EntrepreneurialChoice as a dependent variable 
confounds two different types of non-entrepreneurs: non-entrepreneurs who stayed and non-
entrepreneurs who moved.  In this section we conduct the analyses with a different dependent 
variable: Moves.  We assume three nominal outcomes: where “NoMoves“ = no turnover, 
“EntrepreneurialMoves” = turnover to entrepreneurship, and “OtherMoves“ = turnover to non-
entrepreneurial position.  The Moves variable allows us to test whether different types of 
turnover have different causal antecedents.  In Table 4, the estimating equations for columns (1) 
through (6) are equations (1), (2), (3) of Table 3 respectively with the new dependent variable.
22   
An examination of turnover to entrepreneurship in columns (1) through (3) of Table 4 
shows all variables having coefficients similar in significance and magnitude to those in Table 3.  
However, examining other turnover (to non-entrepreneurial positions) in column (4), we find that 
AnalystStar has a significant negative coefficient (p < 0.01).  Being a star decreases the 
probability of moving to another firm with a marginal effect of 4.4 percent over the mean (at 
which predicted exit probability is 13.7 percent).  Hence, in contrast with what we found for 
movements to entrepreneurship, high performers are less likely to move to competitors than low 
performers.  AnalystExperience has a significant negative coefficient (p < 0.01), whereas 
AnalystJobs has a significant positive coefficient (p < 0.05).  Each additional year of experience 
reduces the analyst's turnover probability by 0.6 percent at the mean.  Analysts’ past movements 
determine their current propensity to move.  Each additional job that an analyst held in the past 
increases the analyst's turnover probability by 1.1 percent at the mean.  AnalystGender has a   20
significant negative coefficient (p < 0.05).  Women have a greater propensity than men to exit 
firms.  Being male reduces the probability of turnover to another firm by 1.1 percent at the mean. 
In examining other turnover in column (5) of Table 4, the results for individual variables 
remain largely unchanged from column (4).  In contrast with the results for movements to 
entrepreneurship, the coefficient of DepartmentQuality is negative and significant (p < 0.01), 
indicating that analysts working in a better department have a lower propensity to exit.  A 1 
percent increase in the percentage of institutional clients who rate the brokerage house as having 
one of the best ten research departments reduces the probability of exit at the mean by 0.2 
percent.  At the firm level, in contrast to entrepreneurial turnover, firm performance significantly 
influences the probability of analyst turnover.  Good investment banking performance by a firm 
in the preceding year (FirmPerformance) reduces the probability of analyst turnover (p < 0.05).  
For a 10 percent negative change in the firm performance, the probability of analyst turnover 
increases by 0.09 percent.  Finally, as we found for moves to entrepreneurship, the sector and 
macroeconomic variables do not have significant coefficients. 
Finally, column (6) of Table 4, which presents the regression results of other moves, 
yields very different results than the self-employed model in column (3) of Table 4.  
AnalystAllStar has a significant negative coefficient (p < 0.01).  Being an all-star reduces the 
probability of turnover to competitors by 6.6 percent at the mean (14.5 percent).  Hence, 
established all-star performers are more likely to stay with their firms or choose 
entrepreneurship.     
Comparing entrepreneurial turnover with other turnover, we document that there are 
differences in factors that drive these two different types of mobility.  In fact, when 
characteristics of these two types of turnover are examined, the same variables change signs   21
(ability and gender).  Situational drivers (department, firm, sector, macro economy) do not drive 
turnover to entrepreneurship; only ability and gender do.  In contrast, situational drivers 
(department and firm) as well as individual ones (ability, experience, prior mobility, and gender) 
drive other turnover.  Our findings suggest that studies that do not differentiate between different 
types of mobility might be documenting less precise relationships between drivers of turnover 
and workers’ mobility.   
4.3   The Determinants of New Venture Survival 
We estimate the probability of the new venture survival as a function of the independent 
variable (performance) and three classes of control variables (demographic factors and 
macroeconomic factors).  We use the following probit model specification:
23  
(3)   P (VentureSurvivali,t+3 ) =           α + β1 x AnalystStari,t + β2 x AnalystGenderi,t  
+  β3 x AnalystExperiencei,t + β4 x S&P500Performancet=0→3  + εi,t+3   
The model in Table 5 presents a regression that estimates the probability of survival in 
three years as a function of analyst stardom, individual, and macroeconomic variables.  The 
estimated coefficient on Analyst star is positive and significant (p < 0.05).  Hence, being ranked 
by Institutional Investor increases the probability of the venture survival after an analyst 
becomes an entrepreneur with a marginal effect of 40.5 percent over the mean (45.9 percent).
24  
New ventures found by more capable analysts have a higher probability to survive for three 
years.
25  Finally, we find that the greater the expansion of the U.S. economy, the higher the 
probability of the venture survival after analysts become entrepreneurs.  The estimated 
coefficient for the S&P 500 performance (t=0 to t+3) variable is positive and significant (p < 
0.01).  For a 10 percent proportional positive change in the S&P 500 index during a particular 
three-year period, the probability of an analyst’s entrepreneurial success increases by 7.0 percent   22
over the mean.  Overall, our results suggest that analyst’s ability and performance of the 
economy influence venture’s survival.   
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
Many economists and social scientist agree that entrepreneurship has become an 
important phenomenon in our society.  However, few studies have examined empirically the 
entrepreneurial activity in the professional service industries.  Furthermore, no empirical studies 
explore the effects of workers’ ability on entrepreneurial activity.  In this paper, we examine the 
effect of workers’ ability on (a) probability of their entrepreneurial turnover and (b) subsequent 
survival of new ventures.  We also control for other potential drivers of turnover besides 
performance at five levels: demographic, departmental, firm, professional specialization, and 
macroeconomic characteristics.  We offer new evidence on the determinants of turnover to 
entrepreneurship and the factors affecting survival of new ventures in the context of a 
professional service industry.   
Analysis of entrepreneurial efforts from a panel data set of equity research analysts in 
investment banks over 1988-1996 reveals that star analysts are more likely than non-star analysts 
to become entrepreneurs.  We also find that ventures founded by star analysts have a higher 
probability to survive in three years than non-star analysts, and the probability of survival is 
procyclical with the performance of the economy.   
Many empirical studies of employee turnover treat all exits from a firm alike.  We have 
found that turnover to entrepreneurship has different dynamics from other turnover.  Hence, 
theoretical models as well as empirical studies of turnover of workers should disentangle the 
different types of turnover by destination.  In contrast to entrepreneurial turnover, we find that   23
star analysts are less likely than their non-star counterparts to experience other turnover; more 
experienced analysts are less likely to exit their firms than less experienced analysts; being male 
decreases the probability of other turnover; analysts’ past movements increase their current 
propensity to move; the probability of other turnover is greater for lower-rated research 
departments; and other turnover is anticyclical with the performance of the firm.  
This study contributes to several recent lines of research.  Our results empirically support 
Lucas’ (1978) theoretical prediction that the relatively more talented workers become 
entrepreneurs.  Furthermore, our findings are consistent with the works of (Zucker, et al. 1998) 
that leading professionals found companies to earn rents on their intellectual capital.  Also, 
supporting prior studies (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998), we find that being male increases the 
probability of turnover to entrepreneurship. By exploring the phenomenon of turnover within the 
context of professionals in the labor market of equity security analysts, the paper also contributes 
to research in talent allocation (Rosen 1981) and labor market competition (Lazear 1986).    
One limitation of this paper is that the sample includes a restricted class of agents, 
security analysts.  Future research conducted in different settings would be helpful to confirm the 
relationship between ability and entry and exit from entrepreneurship.  Comparing the 
entrepreneurial turnover pattern of equity analysts with the turnover dynamics of engineers, 
software programmers, money managers, and other professionals could help test the 
generalization of our conclusions across various professions. 
Our findings have implications for the allocation of resources by policy-makers and other 
institutions promoting entrepreneurial activity.  Our findings have implications for human 
resource practitioners as well.  Whereas firms try to minimize turnover to competitors, at the 
same time, they might be maximizing entrepreneurial turnover.  To our knowledge, no study has   24
been able to establish what mobility is more damaging to the firm.  We believe that it is an 
important question for future research.   
   25
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1 Throughout the paper we use entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial activity, self-employment or 
entrepreneurial choice as equivalent expressions.  Following Evans and Leighton (1989), the 
self-employed category includes all sole proprietors, partners, and sole owners of incorporated 
business. 
2 Hereafter, we use the terms ranked analysts and star analysts interchangeably to refer to 
analysts ranked by Institutional Investor magazine.   29
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 Following Schumpeter’s (1934) holistic perspective on entrepreneurship, we argue that the 
probability of a professional becoming an entrepreneur and her chances of success are 
simultaneously influenced by variables at different levels of analysis. 
4 Wholey (1993) studies organization formation among physicians when interests of corporate 
clients are strong and professional diversity leads professional groups to expand their jurisdiction 
by organizing.  In Headen (1990), the labor and entrepreneurial components of reported 
physicians’ net income are separated in an analysis of input and output market performance.  
Pennings et al. (1998) examine the effect of human and social capital upon firm dissolution with 
data from a population of Dutch accounting firms.  Finally, Zucker et al. (1998) find that the 
timing and location of the birth of biotech enterprises is determined primarily by the local 
number of highly productive 'star' scientists actively publishing genetic sequence discoveries. 
5 Rosen (1981) has emphasized that “the phenomenon of superstars, wherein relatively small 
numbers of people earn enormous amounts of money and dominate the activity in which they 
engage” (p. 845) is becoming increasingly important in the modern society, particularly in the 
worlds of sports, arts, music, literature, medicine, law, consulting, academics, science, show 
business, and other professions.  The combination of both the joint consumption technology and 
imperfect substitution allows few superstars to command very large markets and large incomes.  
The model might be interpreted that the individuals of extraordinary ability, superstars, are more 
likely to set up their own firms and, thus, capture high rewards for their services that they were 
not able to capture working for someone else.  
6 Following Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982), Irigoyen (2002) summarizes entrepreneurial 
activities into two categories: management (human capital intensive) and supervision or 
coordination (time intensive).  More able entrepreneurs in this context are interpreted as better   30
                                                                                                                                                                                           
managers that also have more effective time.  In his model, skills or human capital is defined as 
knowledge that can be innate or acquired through time. 
7 The definition of survival varies enormously across studies (see Watson and Everett (1993) for 
a good review), challenging comparability of results across research studies.   
8 For instance, in October 1996, Institutional Investor magazine produced a ranking for each of 
the 80 equity industry groups and investment specialties.  The survey reflected the ratings of 
around 1,300 customers, representing approximately 68 percent of the 300 largest institutions in 
the United States, as well as other investment management institutions.  
9 At most investment banks, a position on the All-America Research Team is one of the three 
most important criteria for determining analyst pay (Dorfman 1991). 
10 We identified 42 analysts whose names changed during the nine-year period, primarily 
because of the addition or change of last names subsequent to a change in marital status, so as to 
ensure that they were not double counted. 
11  Although we specifically identify analysts’ moves, we have followed analysts that move 
outside the industry for a year.  It is possible that later on they would have moved to self-
employment.  However, over the nine years, we are not aware of any such case.   
12 Analysis on what drives each type of move within other moves (moved to competitors, moved 
to buy-side, laid off, retired, died, joined the firms that they had been covering for years) lies 
outside the scope of this paper. 
13 A number of studies report that new entrepreneurs are driven by the desire to build some 
equity.  But analysts are able to extract their value from their employers because of the external 
observability of their performance (stock recommendations, earnings forecasts, and research 
reports).  Some firms succeed in retaining their analysts by allowing them to operate as   31
                                                                                                                                                                                           
independent franchises within the firm.  Analysis of turnover across the 24 firms using firm 
dummies (regressions are not reported) suggests significant inter-firm differences.  We find that 
analysts from UBS, Montgomery, and Kidder Peabody become entrepreneurs more frequently 
than do those from DLJ, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, and Sanford C. 
Bernstein.  Analysts’ entrepreneurial activity might depend on the firm’s structure and the 
relationship between the firm and its employees.  For example, at DLJ and Sanford C. Bernstein 
the analysts are treated as entrepreneurs running their own franchises.  In fact, these analysts 
have their own individualized profit and loss statements.  The authors would like to thank 
George Baker and Robert Gibbons for offering this insight. 
14 First, the Census data was used to distinguish analysts’ gender.  Three hundred and seventy 
nine analysts’ first names are used by both men and women.  Thus, we looked up their 
interviews, press releases, and other available public information to identify the gender of those 
analysts.  
15 Correlations among the independent and control variables highlight the following 
relationships.  We have age data for only 42 percent of the ranked analysts.  For these, age is 
highly correlated with analyst experience (0.55).  AnalystExperiencei,t is also highly correlated 
with analyst firm tenure (0.73).  To avoid multicollinearity among independent variables, we use 
AnalystExperiencei,t as not only a measure of analyst experience but also a proxy for analyst age.   
16 The Greenwich Associates results are based on the total number of responses for each firm 
given by the survey respondents, thus favoring larger staffs with broader coverage.   
Departmental size is indeed highly correlated with quality (0.61).   
17 We also collected firm performance data for publicly quoted investment banks by calculating 
for the prior year change in stock price performance deflated by changes in the Dow Jones   32
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Security Broker index.  Information on stock price performance is available only for public firms 
(46 percent analyst-year combinations).  Therefore, we use the FirmPerformancei,t variable in all 
subsequent analyses.  Using deflated stock price performance instead yields similar regression 
results although, because stock price performance is available for far fewer observations than is 
investment banking performance, the predictive power of regressions is lower if it is used as the 
proxy for relative firm performance.  
18 Industry experts assert that turnover on Wall Street varies with the nature of the sectors 
analysts cover; some sectors are “hot”, others are not (Institutional Investor 1997, 1998).  As 
sectors become “hot”– i.e. technological breakthrough, deregulation, globalization – the range of 
opportunities increases for professionals.  It becomes easier for analysts to set up their own 
firms.  To test this hypothesis, we calculate the sectors’ deflated stock market performance (the 
proportionate change in the stock price of the sector followed deflated by the S&P 500 index), 
which, on average, increases by 1.0 percent during any one year.  Information on sector 
performance is available only for the 76 percent analyst-year combinations.  Our findings 
contradict popular wisdom.  We do not find an increase in analysts’ entrepreneurial activity 
when sectors are “hot.” 
19 We run a robust cluster probit regression model on the panel data set with individual analysts 
as clusters.  The probit robust cluster model regression is particularly robust to assumptions 
about within-cluster correlation (Greene 2000).  We have tested the alternative specification of 
random effects for the probit regressions.  The results of the two specifications are quite similar.     
Because there are 45 moves to entrepreneurship among the 9,531 analyst-year 
observations, we implemented the procedures suggested in King and Zeng (1999a; 1999b) for 
generating approximately unbiased and lower-variance estimates of logit coefficients (available   33
                                                                                                                                                                                           
only for logit models) and their variance-covariance matrix by correcting for small samples and 
rare events.  Regression results are similar to the robust cluster probit models (we only report the 
latter).  
20 The number of observations decreases with the introduction of the analyst demographic 
variables (AnalystExperience and AnalystJobs).  Even after using multiple sources to collect the 
experience information, analyst experience and analyst job data were available for 8,112 analyst-
year combinations (85 percent).  Thus, to properly test whether analyst stardom has an effect on 
analysts’ mobility, we rerun models in columns (1) through (2) of Table 3 without the 
AnalystExperience and AnalystJobs variables.  The new regressions have similar results to the 
respective models in Table 3.  
21 Previous studies have found that the wealth of the agent affects the probability of becoming an 
entrepreneur.  Wealth would be positive related to riskier decisions such the one of becoming an 
entrepreneur.  However, other studies did not find that correlation.  Indeed, in their study on 
Indian farmers, Foster and Rosensweig (1995) find that change from one crop to a riskier crop 
could not be explained by wealth effects.  Instead, it is explained by their ability of dealing with 
external markets.  Although, our model does not include variables that capture the financial 
position of the analyst (because there is no information available on the personal wealth of 
analysts), we believe that the decision of becoming an entrepreneur in a talent based occupation 
is closer to the idea of mastering the environment instead of triggered by the comfort of a 
wealthy position.  New ventures in a professional setting do not require great investments; it 
requires a great deal of personal confidence and client/market understanding  
22 A nominal dependent variable can be analyzed via multinomial logistic regression.  Whereas 
recent results on simulation of multinormal integrals have made the estimation of the   34
                                                                                                                                                                                           
multinomial probit more feasible, the computational problems still persist.  Although there are 
theoretical differences between logit and probit methodologies, probit and logit yield results that 
are essentially indistinguishable from each other, and the choice of one over the other appears to 
make virtually no differences in practice (Greene 2000).  We find that the estimates from the 
binary regression are close to those from the multinomial logit model.  Thus, we use a probit 
model to estimate our equations with the reference group being analysts who did not move.     
23 We find appropriate to use a probit model instead of a hazard rate model given the way we 
have defined the survival variable.  The hazard rate is the conditional likelihood that firm failure 
occurs at duration time t, given that it has not occurred in the duration interval (0,t).  In contrast, 
a probit model considers the likelihood that firm failure occurs during the study period (ignoring 
the duration of the interval).  In other words, the probit model considers whether the firm will 
fail during the study period, rather than when the firm will fail.  We are interested on the 
probability of survival of the firm three years after founding.   
24 There were no acquisitions of new ventures by other companies.  All exits of new ventures in 
our study include the discontinuation of ventures, an indicator of business failure.   
25 Selection effect mechanisms may be driving this result.  That is, stars are in a position to select 
more promising projects that had a priori higher chances to survive independent of analyst’s 
ability per se.  Further, high ability analysts may leverage their industry contacts to attract talent 
to the new venture (traders, analysts, and salesmen) as well as clients.  For instance, Dorfman 
(1974) reports “When Andrew Zunser, a top rated insurance analysts, decided to set up his own 
firm, he checked with his major accounts and 90 percent of them agreed to go along with him if 
he went out on his own, with the remaining 10 percent not closing the doors.”   
 Probability of becoming an entrepreneur
EntrepreneurialChoice 9531 0.005 0.069 0 1
Probability of moving
EntrepreneurialMoves
a 7799 0.006 0.076 0 1
OtherMoves
b 9486 0.183 0.386 0 1
Analyst variables
-  Stardom variables
AnalystStar 9531 0.358 0.479 0 1
AnalystAllStar 9531 0.210 0.407 0 1
-  Demographic & career variables
AnalystGender 9531 0.765 0.424 0 1
AnalystExperience 8112 7.625 5.980 0.003 57.823
AnalystJobs 8112 1.585 0.855 1 6
Research department variables
DepartmentQuality 9531 30.832 15.810 0 58
Firm variables
FirmDummy 9531 - - 1 24
FirmPerformance 9037 0.252 1.201 -1.000 14.250
Sector variables
SectorDummy 9531 - - 1 80
SectorSize 9531 136.813 85.427 1 492
Security industry & macroeconomic performance
S&P500Performance 9531 0.113 0.131 -0.091 0.289
YearDummy 9531 - - 1 9
Analyst variables
-  Stardom variables
AnalystStar 45 0.622 0.490 0 1
-  Demographic variables
AnalystGender 45 0.933 0.252 0 1
AnalystExperience 45 8.609 6.205 0.764 24.600
Macroeconomic performance variables
S&P500Performance (t=0 to t=+3) 45 0.584 0.358 0.101 1.208
a Excludes other moves
b Excludes moves to entrepreneurship


















































































































































































































































1988 1008 392 7 1.8 1 0.2 39 9.9 113 18.3 46 11.7 114 18.5
1989 984 385 2 0.5 1 0.2 28 7.3 175 29.2 30 7.8 176 29.4
1990 894 369 3 0.8 2 0.4 40 10.8 124 23.6 43 11.7 126 24.0
1991 925 386 4 1.0 3 0.6 41 10.6 98 18.2 45 11.7 101 18.7
1992 986 393 1 0.3 2 0.3 38 9.7 104 17.5 39 9.9 106 17.9
1993 1097 435 2 0.5 0 0.0 44 10.1 144 21.8 46 10.6 144 21.8
1994 1168 430 4 0.9 3 0.4 62 14.4 201 27.2 66 15.3 204 27.6
1995 1159 306 1 0.3 3 0.4 33 10.8 180 21.1 34 11.1 183 21.5
1996 1310 312 4 1.3 2 0.2 32 10.3 236 23.6 36 11.5 238 23.8
Total 9531 3408 28 0.8
a 17 0.3 357 10.5
a 1375 22.5 385 11.3
a 1392 22.7


































AnalystStar 0.389 *** 0.007
a 0.376 *** 0.005
a
(0.150) (0.132)
AnalystAllStar 0.338 ** 0.006
a
(0.143)
-  Demographic variables
AnalystGender 0.386 ** 0.005
a 0.430 ** 0.004
a 0.416 ** 0.004
a
(0.197) (0.187) (0.189)
AnalystExperience -0.012 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.005 0.000
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
AnalystExperience
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AnalystJobs 0.089 0.001 0.103 * 0.001 0.107 * 0.001
(0.064) (0.060) (0.060)
Research department variables












S&P500Performance -0.437 -0.005 -0.517 -0.007
(0.472) (0.474)
Constant -3.204 *** -3.115 ***
(0.244) (0.248)
Log (likehood) -219.534 -254.482 -255.614
No. of observations 4563 7712 7712
*statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.
Note.- Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for intra-analyst correlation of the errors. 
a dF/dx is for discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Table 3. The Effect of Stardom on the Probability of Moving to Entrepreneurship 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(1) (2) (3)
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[dF/dx] [dF/dx] [dF/dx] [dF/dx] [dF/dx] Coefficient [dF/dx]
Analyst variables
-  Stardom
AnalystStar 0.388 ***  0.008
a 0.362 *** 0.006
a -0.207 *** -0.044
a -0.223 ***  -0.050
a
(0.151) (0.134) (0.043) (0.042)
AnalystAllStar 0.319 ** 0.006
a -0.316 *** -0.066
a
(0.144) (0.052)
-  Demographic variables
AnalystGender 0.380 *  0.005
a 0.419 ** 0.005
a 0.407 ** 0.005
a -0.197 *** -0.046
a -0.178 ***  -0.043
a -0.169 *** -0.040
a
(0.202) (0.191) (0.193) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042)
AnalystExperience -0.014 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.030 *** -0.007 -0.031 *** -0.007 -0.030 *** -0.007
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
AnalystExperience
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AnalystJobs 0.095 0.001 0.112 * 0.002 0.117 * 0.002 0.051 ** 0.011 0.086 *** 0.020 0.083 *** 0.019
(0.065) (0.061) (0.060) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Research department variables
DepartmentQuality -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.009 *** -0.002 -0.009 *** -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm variables
Firm Dummy yes yes
FirmPerformance -0.062 -0.001 -0.064 -0.001 -0.041 ** -0.009 -0.040 ** -0.009
(0.039) (0.039) (0.016) (0.016)
Sector variables
Sector Dummy yes yes
SectorSize*100 0.076 0.001 0.066 0.001 -0.013 -0.003 -0.014 -0.003
(0.060) (0.061) (0.021) (0.021)
Macroeconomic performance
Year Dummy yes yes
S&P500Performance -0.457 -0.007 -0.529 -0.008 -0.061 -0.014 -0.029 -0.007
(0.478) (0.480) (0.138) (0.136)
Constant -3.094 *** -3.011 *** -0.442 *** -0.472 ***
(0.248) (0.253) (0.075) (0.075)
Log (likehood) -212.89 -247.94 -249.02 -3219.56 -3181.64 -3176.57
No. of observations 3893 6531 6531 8032 7669 7669
*statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.
Note.- Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for intra-analyst correlation of the errors. 
a dF/dx is for discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
(3) (4)
Table 4. The Effect of Stardom on Analysts' Transition Probability









AnalystStar 1.094 ** 0.405
a
(0.508)












Number of observations 45
*statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.
a dF/dx is the marginal increase due to a given variable controlling for every other 
variables.
Table 5. The Effect of Stardom on the Probability of Firm Survival
Coefficient
 